US v. Figueroa

US v. Figueroa, No. 061595 (18 Nov 2008)
Conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm is affirmed where:

1) although the trial court violated defendant’s right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment when it prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining a government witness about his swastika tattoos despite the fact that the defendant was a member of a minority group; however

2) the error was harmless because it “did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”

People v. Zavala

People v. Zavala, No. F051843 (24 Nov 2008)
Conviction for second degree murder, torture, and kidnapping, and firearms-related allegations is affirmed over claims of error that:

1) the doctrine of collateral estoppel required reversal of the torture count;

2) the admission of certain hearsay statements as adoptive admissions violated both the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause and that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel if the absence of a constitutional objection forfeited his right to appellate review; and

3) CALCRIM No. 220 impermissibly precluded the jury from considering lack of evidence on the issue of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Genovese

People v. Genovese, No. C055486 (24 Nov 2008)
Conviction for second degree murder is affirmed where there was no instructional error in the CALCRIM homicide instructions given to the jury.

People v. Jean-Baptiste

People v. Jean-Baptiste, No. 174 (25 Nov 2008)
Reduction of conviction to manslaughter in the second degree is affirmed where, because the Appellate Division properly applied the present standard for depraved indifference murder, the evidence introduced at trial was not legally sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt of depraved indifference murder.

US v. Blixt

US v. Blixt, No. 07-30198 (26 Nov 2008)
In an appeal from a jury conviction and sentence for mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. section 1341 and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. section 1028A, motion to dismiss, motion for acquittal, proposed jury instructions relating to the aggravated identity theft count, and sentence are affirmed where:

1) forging another’s signature constitutes the use of that person’s name and thus qualifies as a “means of identification” under 18 U.S.C. section 1028A;

2) steps taken in furtherance of a fraudulent purpose are material;

3) the jury instructions provided the jury with adequate and accurate guidance to determine the issues of mail fraud and/or aggravated identity theft;

4) the district court properly considered the defendant’s non-conviction conduct in determining her sentence; and

5) the sentence imposed was reasonable.

US v. Spotted Elk

US v. Spotted Elk, No. 071914 (26 Nov 2008)
Conviction for multiple drug and gun crimes in connection with the operation of a drug trafficking business on the state Pine Ridge Oglala Sioux Reservation is affirmed in all respects except is reversed and remanded where:

1) the indictment in Count VI was misleading as it suggested that receiving as well as giving a gun in exchange would constitute “use” of a gun in connection with the drug transaction; and

2) the district court’s findings regarding the amount of drugs for which co-defendant was responsible at sentencing were based on a legally erroneous interpretation of section 1B1.3 and because the evidence could well have supported a different finding had the district court applied the correct rule the case is remanded for resentencing.

People v. Rubin

People v. Rubin, No. b201672 (1 Dec 2008)
Conviction for selling marijuana and possessing marijuana for sale is affirmed over claim that the trial court erred in excluding references to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, United States Constitution, and the state Constitution as part of defendant’s religious freedom defense.

People v. Hassan

People v. Hassan, No. B194141 (8 Dec 2008)
In a prosecution involving marriage fraud for immigration purposes, a conviction for offering false or forged instrument for recording and offering false evidence is reversed in part and affirmed in part where:

1) there was undisputed evidence defendant did not live in the same dwelling as his alleged wife;

2) “living together” as written in section Penal Code section 115 means cohabitating; and

3) defendant was improperly convicted of offering false evidence.

Jianniney v. State of Delaware

Jianniney v. State of Delaware, No. 350, 2007 (10 Dec 2008)
Judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, as the trial court erred in admitting Mapquest printouts under an exception to the hearsay rule for published compilations. The printouts were admitted for the truth of the website’s driving time estimates, but the State offered no evidence that those estimates are relied upon by the public or by professional drivers.

Hardy v. State of Delaware

Hardy v. State of Delaware, No. 126, 2008 (9 Dec 2008)
Convictions for Rape First Degree, Unlawful Imprisonment First Degree, and Aggravated Menacing are reversed and remanded where the prosecutor vouched for the State’s case by commenting, in his closing remarks to the jury, that falsely reported rapes do not go to trial.

Standard Jury Instructions of Manslaughter Case in Florida

In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases — Report No. 2007-10, No. SC07-2324
The Court hereby authorizes modifications to Standard Jury Instruction 7.7 (Manslaughter).

Tennis v. State of Florida

Tennis v. State of Florida, No. SC06-730 (11 Dec 2008)
First-degree felony murder conviction and death sentence are reversed and remanded where the trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine whether Defendant’s unequivocal request for self-representation was a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to court-appointed counsel.

Larimore v. State of Florida

Larimore v. State of Florida, No. SC06-139 (11 Dec 2008)
In order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction, an individual must be in lawful custody when the State takes steps to initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to the Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, commonly known as the Jimmy Ryce Act.

Poole v. State of Florida

Poole v. State of Florida, No. SC05-1770 (11 Dec 2008)
Death sentence is vacated and a new penalty phase ordered where the prosecutor’s improper cross-examination of defense witnesses constituted inadmissible nonstatutory aggravation. The trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection after the prosecutor asked questions regarding unproven prior arrests and the unproven content of a tattoo.

People v. Hernandez

People v. Hernandez, No. S150038 (11 Dec 2008)
An officer who sees a vehicle displaying a temporary operating permit in lieu of license plates may not stop the vehicle simply because he or she believes that such permits are often forged or otherwise invalid. To support a stop the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the particular permit is invalid.

In re Raymond C., No. S149728
In a companion case to People v. Hernandez, __ Cal.4th __ (Dec. 12, 2008, S150038), the California Supreme Court rules that the officer in this DUI case acted with sufficient particularized suspicion to justify the traffic stop in circumstances where the officer saw that defendant’s car did not have license plates or a temporary permit in the rear window, and he could not see whether there was a temporary permit in the front window (which there was).

US v. West

US v. West, No. 06-4284 (10 Dec 2008)
A prior conviction under Utah law for failing to stop at an officer’s command qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) residual language. A sentence for being a previously-convicted felon in possession of a firearm is remanded for further proceedings where:

1) although a presentence report (PSR) contained facts supporting the application of various enhancements, defendant adequately disputed those facts at sentencing;

2) thus, the district court was obligated, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B), either to rule on those disputes or explain why the disputed facts were not relevant to sentencing; and

3) the district court failed to meet its fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(i)(3)(B).